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In this paper, we test whether micro firms run by migrants pay more for credit than firms run 
by natives and whether the differences in the cost of credit for these two groups of entrepreneurs 
decrease as the informational and cultural gaps narrow. We employ a large and unique data set 
providing us with detailed information on each overdraft loan granted by banks to sole 
proprietorships based in Italy. We find that migrants pay, on average, almost 70 basis points more 
for credit than natives. The interest rate differential is lower for entrepreneurs born in Italy whose 
parents were natives of other countries (“second generation” migrants) and for migrants whose 
parents were natives of Italy (“Italian migrants”). These results suggest that cultural differences 
may matter for the functioning of the credit market. A lengthening of credit history reduces the 
interest rate differential between the two types of entrepreneurs. Finally, we find that both increases 
in the size of the migrant community and improvements in banks’ ability to deal with cultural 
diversity help narrow the interest rate differential between migrant and Italian entrepreneurs. 
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    1. 1.    Introduction Introduction
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The recent strong growth in migrant entrepreneurship provides banking systems with new 
lending opportunities. However, lending to firms run by migrants may require specific skills and 
investments. Besides those related to small firm lending in general, stemming from informational 
opaqueness,
2 lending to migrants may require some further effort to ‘bridge the gap’ between 
lenders and borrowers due to cultural and institutional differences between the home and host 
country. All other things being equal, migrant creditworthiness might be more difficult to assess 
compared to other borrowers. Furthermore, apart from informational gaps, cultural and 
institutional differences between countries may also fuel skepticism or mistrust towards 
migrants. All these factors are likely to adversely affect migrants’ access to the credit market.  
 
In this paper, we address two related issues. First, we test whether micro firms run by migrants 
pay more for credit than firms run by native entrepreneurs. Second, we verify whether the 
differences in the cost of credit for these two groups of entrepreneurs are attenuated as the 
informational and cultural gaps narrow. For this purpose we employ a large and unique data set 
containing detailed information on loan contracts obtained from the Italian Credit Register (CR) 
and the Bank of Italy Survey on Loan Interest Rates.
3 This is the first paper to address these 
issues in Italy. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is also the first to investigate different 
channels by which the gap between migrants and banks may be bridged. 
 
Italy is a suitable country for investigating these issues because migrant entrepreneurship is a 
growing and recent phenomenon. In December 2009 there were over 250,000 sole 
proprietorships run by migrants, more than double the number in 2003, when they were around 
100,000. Migration and foreign entrepreneurship, in particular, are relatively new phenomena in 
Italy. This may exacerbate the difficulties migrants face when accessing the credit market in Italy 
compared to other countries, which are more accustomed to lending to minorities. 
 
The literature on discrimination in the access to credit markets focuses mostly on the United 
States. Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo (1998), more recently Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo and Wolken 
(2002), and Blanchflower, Levine and Zimmerman (2003) provide evidence that banks 
discriminate against firms owned by African-Americans; the paper by Fraser (2009) concerns 
small business credit in the UK. Alesina, Lotti and Mistrulli (2008) find evidence showing that 
female owned firms pay more for credit than male ones in Italy. Other papers have investigated 
the credit market for households (e.g., Browne, McEneaney, Munnell and Tootell, 1996; Tootell, 
1996; Ross and Yinger, 2002; Edelberg, 2007) showing that discrimination in the market for 
mortgages is less widespread than in business lending. In their study of the market for 
syndicated loans, Giannetti and Yafeh (2008) show that the greater the cultural distance between 
the lender and the borrower the less favorable the credit conditions. Bottazzi, Da Rin and 
Hellmann (2007) provide similar evidence for the venture capital market. More generally, Guiso, 
Sapienza and Zingales (2006), and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) suggest that cultural factors 
affect economic outcomes. Other studies indicate that different levels of creditor protection in 
native countries affect migrant access to financial services in the host one (Osili and Paulson, 
2008 and 2008).  
 
According to the results of our empirical analysis, firms run by migrants pay, on average, almost 
70 basis points more for credit than those run by entrepreneurs born in Italy. We then 
 
1 We wish to thank Giorgio Gobbi, Alfonso Rosolia, Enrico Sette, Alberto Zazzaro and an anonymous referee for 
their helpful comments, and Cristiana Rampazzi for excellent research assistance. 
2  The literature on bank financing to informational opaque firms is extensive; for a survey see Elyasiani and 
Goldberg (2004).  
3 For a detailed description of the data used in the paper see section 2 below. 
  5investigate different channels through which the interest rate differential between migrants and 
Italians may narrow. First, we verify whether the cost of credit for migrants converges towards 
that charged to natives as the relationship with the banking system continues. In particular, we 
find that the interest rate spread narrows as credit history lengthens. We interpret the fact that 
firms run by migrants, due to their higher ex-ante “opaqueness”, benefit more from repeated 
interaction with the banking system as evidence that relatively more information is conveyed to 
banks about migrant entrepreneurs compared to other firms. Moreover, a longer credit history 
helps migrants to participate more effectively in the financial sector (“financial integration”). 
Notwithstanding these effects, the interest rate differential does not disappear. This might be 
due to a persistent cultural gap between banks and migrants. This interpretation is consistent 
with the evidence on the cost of credit for some entrepreneurs who are presumably culturally 
close to natives: a) the interest rate differential is lower for entrepreneurs born in Italy whose 
parents are foreign (second generation migrants) and b) among those born abroad, for those whose 
family was originally Italian (Italian migrants). Secondly, we show that broad migrant social 
networking also reduces the interest rate gap. This result suggests that banks may obtain relevant 
information not only through repeated interaction with the same borrower but also by 
interacting with different borrowers of the same type. Finally, the interest rate spread between 
migrants and natives narrows as the banks’ ability to deal with cultural diversities improves.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 reports our 
empirical results of our econometric analysis of the interest rate differential between migrant and 
Italian entrepreneurs. Section 4 investigates the ways in which the interest rate differential may 
be narrowed. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. 2.    Data    Data
   
The data come from two sources: the Credit Register (CR) run by the Bank of Italy, containing 
detailed information on all loan contracts granted to each borrower whose total debt from a 
bank exceeds 75,000 euros (30,000 euros since January 2009; no threshold is required for bad 
loans), and the Bank of Italy Loan Interest Rate Survey, including information on interest rates 
charged on each loan granted by a sample of about 200 Italian banks. This sample is highly 
representative of the Italian market for loans to small firms: these banks account for over 80 per 
cent of the total loans granted to micro firms. Furthermore, the sample is representative of the 
universe of Italian banks in terms of size, category and location.  
 
Data refer to overdraft loans granted to micro firms. We focus on micro firms (sole 
proprietorships) for two main reasons. First, by looking at their individual taxpayer’s number, 
obtained from the CR, it is easy to identify migrants’ countries of origin. Second, sole 
proprietorships are commonplace throughout Italy and they also prevail among start-ups.  
 
We investigate overdraft facilities (i.e. credit lines) for the following reasons. First, this kind of 
lending represents the main liquidity management tool for very small firms which cannot afford 
more sophisticated instruments. Second, since these loans are highly standardized, a cross-firm 
comparison of the cost of credit is not affected by unobservable (to an econometrician) loan-
contract specific covenants. Third, overdraft facilities are loans that are not granted for any 
specific purpose, as is the case of mortgages, or on the basis of a specific trade transaction, as is 
the case for advances against trade credit receivables. As a consequence, according to Berger and 
Udell (1995) the pricing of these loans is strongly associated with the borrower-lender 
relationship, thus providing us with a better tool for testing the existence of discrimination 
against migrant entrepreneurs. 
 
  6After a filtering procedure, we end up with a sample of over 2.4 million observations relative to 
18 quarters from March 2004 to June 2008.
4 The number of migrant firms is much lower (about 
5,000) than that of native firms (almost 225,000). Therefore our sample is highly unbalanced. In 
particular, migrants tend to be concentrated in a few towns and sectors. They display a much 
shorter credit history and they tend to borrow from a lower number of banks compared to 
natives. Non-Italian entrepreneurs are relatively younger than their Italian counterparts (table 1): 
those under 40 years of age account for 50 per cent of migrant entrepreneurs, compared to only 
30 per cent for Italians. They are also relatively more likely to run firms in the construction 
sector. The average size is similar to that of Italian firms, even if artisans are more widespread 
among migrants. The share of migrants’ micro firms run by women (26 per cent) is higher than 
that of Italians (19 per cent). The credit history of Italian entrepreneurs is double that of 
migrants. Most of the migrant firms are located in northern Italy (over 65 per cent); 24 per cent 
of them are located in central Italy, while only 11 per cent are in southern Italy.  
 
Due to these strong distributional differences, in the next section we also present the results of 
the econometric analysis based on a smaller but highly balanced sample. 
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In this section we test whether micro firms run by migrants pay more for credit than those run 
by natives. The basic regression equation is the following: 
 
(i) r i,j,t = α + θimmij + βfirmj,t + γcrediti,j,t + δpublic aidj,t + μcredit historyj,t + ρtimet +  εi,j,t 
  
where r is the interest rate charged on the overdraft loan granted by bank i to firm j at the 
quarter t, immi is a dummy which equals 1 for micro firms run by migrants, 0 otherwise (see table 
2 for a detailed description of the variables used in our estimates).  
 
Firm represents a set of control variables concerning the firm’s characteristics including 
economic sector (around 200), location dummies (103 provinces), and the entrepreneur’s age.  
 
Credit is a set of controls for bank lending characteristics: loan size, presence of real guarantees 
specifically posted to overdraft loans, number of banks financing the firm, and a dummy taking 
the value of 1 if banks other than bank i classify some loan granted to firm j as a bad loan.  
 
Public aid is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the firm has benefited from public subsidies, 
0 otherwise; migrant firms may be less likely to be granted public subsidies, which may affect 
credit conditions. 
 
We control for the number of years that have elapsed since the firm was first recorded in the CR 
to establish the credit history. This is to ensure that the interest rate differential between migrant 
and native firms is not due to the shorter length of migrants’ credit history. 
 
Finally, to control for changes in macroeconomic conditions during the sample period, we 
include quarter fixed effects (time).  
 
Table 3 reports our estimation results. According to the equation in column 1, migrants pay 68 
basis points more for credit compared to other firms. In the following equations, we restrict our 
sample in order to improve the balance between migrant and non-migrant firms.  
 
4  To exclude outliers data have been trimmed to the 1-99 percentile of the interest rate distribution. 
  7As shown by descriptive statistics, migrants tend to be concentrated in specific economic 
sectors, towns, firm size classes. They also borrow from a lower number of banks and they may 
differ significantly in terms of credit history length. The mismatch between the characteristics of 
natives and migrants exacerbates estimation problems due to unobservables. To mitigate the 
effects of these unobservables on the estimates, we compare migrants with a sub-sample of 
natives that have the same characteristics as the migrants: for each combination of “lender, firm 
sector, firm size, firm town, entrepreneur gender, firm first year of reporting to the CR” 
observed among migrants (7,040 different combinations) we look for the same combination 
among natives, excluding the other ones left. We end up with a highly balanced sample of more 
than 74,000 observations, referring in 48 per cent of cases to migrant firms.   
 
The regression run on this smaller sample confirms the previous result, indicating that interest 
rates charged to migrants are higher (by 62 basis points) than those charged to the other firms 
(column 2). We also check if bank characteristics affect the cost of credit for migrant 
entrepreneurs by introducing the dummy variable large bank and its interaction with immi.
5 The 
results of the estimate show that large banks charge higher interest rates to all entrepreneurs, and 
that the interest rate differential between the two types of entrepreneurs is lower with respect to 
other banks (column 3).  
 
The equation in column 4 adds “pair” fixed effects, i.e. we add dummies for each observed 
combination we use to balance the sample.
6 In this way we jointly control for lender, firm 
sector, firm size, firm town, entrepreneur gender, firm first year of reporting to the CR. Again, 
we find that migrants pay almost 70 basis points more for credit than natives. 
                                                
 
Finally, the results in column 5 suggest that migrants are not all the same. We proxy differences 
among foreign entrepreneurs with their continent of origin. The results indicate that 
entrepreneurs from Eastern Europe pay interest rates that are 1.3 percentage points higher than 
those charged to Italian entrepreneurs; those from Asia and Africa pay almost 40 and 85 basis 
points more respectively. Entrepreneurs from Central and Latin America pay over 20 basis 
points more than their Italian counterparts, while the interest rates paid by entrepreneurs from 
North America and Oceania are not statistically different from those charged to native Italians. 
 
One possible objection to these results is that the CR threshold affects migrants and natives 
differently, thus biasing our results. In particular, if migrant entrepreneurs were less rationed 
than natives our results would over-estimate the interest rate differential. In other words, it may 
be that the CR threshold is such that, even if migrants and natives are of the same type (i.e. the 
distribution of default risk is exactly the same), banks may be relatively more likely to lend to 
riskier migrant firms compared to native ones. As a consequence, due to some unobserved 
variable that correlates with risk, the estimated higher cost of credit observed for migrants is 
only due to such a bias.  
 
To address this issue we employ a sort of natural experiment. In January 2009 the CR census 
threshold was lowered from 75,000 to 30,000 euros. We exploit this regulatory change to assess 
whether migrant firms are more often rationed than native firms. In particular, we estimate a 
probit model for the probability that a firm lies between the 75,000 and 30,000 euro threshold: 
those firms which present a higher probability would suffer more from quantity rationing. In 
practice, we look for those firms which were reported to the Credit Register in January 2009, just 
after the threshold was lowered to 30,000 euros, and would not have been reported were the 
threshold still equal to 75,000 euros. We then check if this probability is lower for migrants, 
 
 
5 See, among others, Stein (2002) and Berger et al. (2005) for both theoretical and empirical evidence. 
6   See Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994). 
  8compared to observationally equivalent natives, by estimating the following probit equation: 
 
(ii) Prob(“rationing”j )= α + ξimmij + βother firm characteristicsj + εj 
 
where firm characteristics include firms’ size, economic sector and province of location.  
 
All other things being equal, we find that the probability for migrants of being “rationed” is 1.2 
per cent higher than for natives. This implies that, if anything, our previous results concerning 
the interest rate differential are downward biased, i.e. the CR census threshold is more binding 
for migrants than for natives and, as a consequence, natives reported to the CR tend to be on 
average riskier than migrants. 
 
This result is also consistent with the higher cost of credit for migrants, supporting the view that 
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In the previous section we showed that migrants pay more for credit than natives. This interest 
rate differential may be attributed to the fact that banks can associate to single migrant 
entrepreneurs the characteristics of their countries of origin (“statistical discrimination”) or to 
“taste-based discrimination”.
  7 We don’t have the necessary information to assess the relative 
importance of these explanations. Instead, we now investigate the ways in which the interest rate 
differential may be narrowed.  
 
In section 4.1 we test whether migrants benefit more than natives from the lengthening of their 
credit history. Cultural and institutional differences between the home and the host country may 
imply that migrants are ex-ante more opaque than natives. As a result, banks can learn more 
about foreign borrowers than natives through repeated interaction. Furthermore, since cultural 
and institutional differences may fuel some skepticism and mistrust against migrants, they 
benefit more from reputational effects stemming from “good” behaviour throughout their credit 
history. Finally, the lengthening of credit history helps migrants to participate more effectively in 
the financial sector (“financial integration”). 
 
Section 4.2 shows that cultural integration also helps migrants narrow the interest rate 
differential. We test this by identifying “second generation” migrants among entrepreneurs born 
in Italy of foreign parents and “Italian migrant” entrepreneurs born abroad whose parents were 
originally Italian.  Indeed, these two groups of entrepreneurs might be culturally closer to natives 
compared to “pure” migrants (i.e. migrants born abroad whose parents were also foreign). 
 
Another channel through which the gap may be bridged is related to the reputation of the 
community of migrants as a whole. In section 4.3 we explore this possibility by testing whether 
the size of the migrant business network helps foreign firms access the credit market.  
 
Finally, bank improvements in interacting with migrants might represent another way of 
bridging the gap between migrants and the banking system. In section 4.4. we test whether the 
recent upgrading in the supply of financial products to migrants may involve improved 
conditions in their access to the banking system. 
 
 
7 See Becker (1971) for more details about the definition of “statistical” and “taste-based” discrimination. 
  94.1 Credit history 
 
The differential between interest rates on loans to migrant and Italian firms may be due to the 
lack of credit history of the former, which have accessed the credit market more recently than 
the latter. On the one hand, repeated interaction with the banking system may help banks assess 
firms’ creditworthiness better,
8 in particular for opaque firms. On the other hand, the 
lengthening of their credit history may strengthen migrants’ reputation and help them deal more 
effectively with banks. Indeed, through repeated interaction they may come to understand the 
rules and functioning of the host banking system better and as a result obtain better credit 
conditions. We also expect the length of credit history to have a greater impact on migrant 
financing conditions since, apart from helping banks overcome information asymmetries, it 
helps migrants to participate more fully in the financial sector (“financial integration”).  
 
To test this hypothesis we estimate the following equation: 
 
(iii)   ri,j,t = α + θimmij + βfirmj,t +  γcrediti,j,t + δpublic aidj,t + μcredit historyj,t*noimmij  + νcredit 
historyj,t*immij + ρtimet +  εi,j,t 
 
which adds to the econometric model (i) two interaction terms: one is credit history*immi and the 
other is credit history*noimmi, where immi and noimmi are dummy variables which equal 1 if the firm 
is run by a migrant (a non migrant for noimmi), and 0 otherwise. This allows us to test if the 
length of the relationship with the banking system has a greater impact on the cost of credit to 
migrants, in accordance with the view that the length of credit history is a proxy for the 
improvement of banks’ knowledge of firms’ characteristics, for the strengthening of migrants’ 
reputation and for their financial integration.  
 
The results reported in column 1 of table 4 show that migrants benefit more than natives from 
an increase in their credit history length, in accordance with our hypothesis that, due to an ex-
ante greater opaqueness, banks learn more about migrants than natives through repeated 
interaction. This result may also reflect the fact that as banks and migrants get to know each 
other better, mistrust and skepticism tend to diminish. It can reasonably be assumed that this 
factor is relatively less important for native entrepreneurs, who are culturally similar to bank 
officers. As a consequence, longer credit histories may also contribute to the narrowing of the 
interest rate differential. 
 
However, our results might also reflect a survival bias affecting natives and migrants in a 
different way. Indeed, the length of credit history is highly correlated with the quality of the firm. 
It might be the case that, as credit history lengthens, riskier borrowers default and then drop out 
from the sample. If this process is faster for migrants compared to natives, then at least part of 
the reduction in the interest rate differential related to credit history might be due to an 
asymmetric survival bias. Our previous result on the probability of rationing suggests that, if any, 
an asymmetric survival bias exists in the direction of widening the interest rate differential 
between migrants and natives when their credit history lengthens. We show that migrants tend 
to be more frequently rationed by banks, implying that ex-ante they are less risky than natives. 
This evidence suggests that creditworthiness evaluation by banks tends to be stricter with 
respect to migrants. 
 
                                                 
8  Altonji and Pierret (1996) investigate a similar issue for the labour market, showing that wages become more 
closely tied to actual worker productivity as long as the employers obtain information during a worker’s career. 
  10If this hypothesis is true, the exit from our sample should concern Italian entrepreneurs more 
than migrant ones.
9 To check this hypothesis we construct a sample including only firms which 
entered into a relationship with the banking system during the first year of our sample period 
(2004 cohort): the percentage of migrant entrepreneurs out of total entrepreneurs at the 
beginning and at the end of the sample period are not statistically different (2.24 per cent in 2004 
and 2.16 per cent in June 2008). This evidence indicates that the survival rate is similar for the 
two kinds of entrepreneurs. We perform the estimate of equation (iii) only on firms belonging to 
the 2004 cohort. The results of the estimate (not reported) are similar to the ones for the total 
sample: both the coefficients of the interactions of credit history with the dummies identifying 
Italian and migrant entrepreneurs are negative and the one associated with migrant 
entrepreneurs is higher in absolute value. This result confirms that the interest rate differential is 
not affected by the existence of a different survival bias between the two types of entrepreneur.  
 
 
4.2 Cultural proximity 
 
The interest rate differential may also depend on a cultural mismatch between borrowers and 
bank officers. To test this hypothesis we isolate two groups of entrepreneurs. First, among the 
entrepreneurs born in Italy we identify those who do not have an Italian surname
10 (e.g. they 
have a Chinese surname but they were born in Italy). We call these borrowers “second 
generation” migrant entrepreneurs. Access to the credit market should be easier for them with 
respect to migrants since they were educated in Italy and know how Italian banks behave. 
Second, among entrepreneurs born abroad there might be someone with an Italian surname, 
indicating that their family was originally Italian. We call them “Italian migrants”.
11 Indeed, their 
Italian origin may help them overcome better than others some skepticism and mistrust from 
Italian banks. These two groups of entrepreneurs represent a non-negligible share of the sample: 
“second generation” entrepreneurs represent 8 per cent of the Italian ones, the “Italian 
migrants” over 40 per cent of the migrants.  
 
We estimate the following equation: 
 
(iv)   ri,j,t = α + θimmij + φsndgenj + ξItalian migrantsj + βfirmj,t +  γcrediti,j,t + δpublic aidj,t + μcredit 
historyj,t +ρtimet + εi,j,t   
 
where  sndgen and Italian migrants are dummy variables identifying, respectively, “second 
generation” and “Italian migrant” entrepreneurs.  
                                                 
9 To see this, let us assume that natives and migrants can be of two types: “good” and “bad” entrepreneurs, who 
survive in a given period with probability P and Q, with P>Q, respectively. Let us assume also that the proportion 
of “good” in the population is the same for both natives and entrepreneurs. However, due to the fact that the credit 
register threshold is more binding for migrants, the proportion of “good” entrepreneurs among them is βm , that is 
greater than the one among natives βn. This means that at t=0, when banks grant the loan, the expected probability 
of survival for migrants in the first period (at t=1) is βmP + (1- βm)Q, i.e. greater than the one for natives βnP + 
(1- βn)Q. In the second period, from t=1 to t=2, due to the fact that “bad” firms are riskier than “good” ones, the 
proportion of “bad” firms at t=1 is lower compared to that at t=0 for both migrants and natives. However, since at 
t=0 the proportion of bad firms was greater among natives, the decline in that share is greater for natives than for 
migrants. Thus, the difference in terms of expected probability of survival between natives and migrants narrows. In 
general, as the credit history lengthens, the average probability of default for natives tends to converge towards that 
for migrants. Consequently, the initial interest rate differential, which was attenuated by the fact that natives were on 
average riskier than migrants, tends to widen as the credit history lengthens. 
10   To identify non-Italian surnames we look at the occurrences of each surname in the CR (for both households 
and sole proprietorships). We assume that a surname is foreign if the number of borrowers with that surname born 
abroad is greater than the number of those born in Italy and their total number is equal to at least 100.  
11 We follow a similar rule to that used for “second generation” migrants. See footnote 10.
 
  11The results of the estimate (table 4, column 2) indicate that “pure” migrants pay the highest 
interest rate (79 basis points more than “pure” Italian entrepreneurs, i.e. Italians net of “second 
generation”); “Italian migrants” pay 55 basis points
12 more, while “second generation” 
entrepreneurs pay only 19 basis points more than “pure” Italians. These findings suggest that 
cultural differences between the host and the home country may fuel banks’ skepticism and 
mistrust against migrants. Indeed, among migrants, those who were originally Italian pay 24 basis 
points less for credit compared to other migrants. Furthermore, among Italians, being born and 
educated in Italy is such that those who were originally foreigners pay little more for credit than 
Italians.  
 
We then test whether the interest rate differential narrows in a different way among these groups 
of entrepreneurs as their credit history lengthens. For this purpose we estimate the following 
equation: 
 
(v)   ri,j,t = α + θimmij + σnoimmij + φsndgenj + ξItalian migrantsj + βfirmj,t +  γcrediti,j,t + δpublic 
aidj,t + τcredit historyj,t + λcredit historyj,t*noimmij + μcredit historyj,t*immij + νcredit 
historyj,t*sndgenj + πcredit historyj,t*Italian migrantsj  + ρtimet + εi,j,t   
 
where we add the interactions between credit history and immi, noimmi, sndgen and Italian migrant 
dummies. We find (table 4, column 3) that “second generation” and “Italian migrants” don’t 
benefit from the lengthening of their credit history more than Italian and migrant entrepreneurs 
respectively (i.e. the coefficients of the interaction between the variables sndgen and Italian 
migrants and the variable credit history are positive and statistically significant, even if they are 
economically negligible). One notable implication of these results is that the interest rate 
differential for “second generation” firms narrows very slowly, indicating a persistent mistrust of 
banks vis à vis entrepreneurs with a foreign family name, notwithstanding the fact that they were 
born in Italy. 
 
 
4.3 Migrant social networking 
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that migrants are socially interconnected
13. This can compensate 
for the lack of individual credit history, helping them to access the credit market in different 
ways and thus lower the cost of credit. First, migrants tend to benefit from the reputation gained 
by other people from the same country. Banks can exploit cross-sectional data to infer some 
migrant behavioral characteristics which could affect their default risk. Second, minorities tend 
to behave as a community. This implies that the most trustworthy migrant entrepreneurs act as 
mentors, helping firms which lack a credit history to access the credit market. This also means 
that people from the same community might be backed by a sort of informal mutual guarantee 
which lowers the loss given default for lenders. Indeed, in order to save the reputation of their 
ethnic group, members of the same community may want to help member firms in the event of 
financial distress, to prevent them from defaulting. Third, being a community with a solid 
reputation can create strong incentives for peer monitoring within the group, contributing to 
lower default risk. All these channels relate more to migrant entrepreneurs than to other 
migrants because the first ones can build their trustworthiness through their business 
performance.   
 
To measure what we call the “network effect” we make two assumptions. First, communities are 
made up of people from the same country. Second, physical proximity is required to make the 
                                                 
12 “Italian migrant” entrepreneurs are a subset of migrants; the interest rate differential is obtained by summing the 
coefficients estimated for the variables immi and Italian migrants. 
13 See Unioncamere (2007). 
  12community work. For these reasons, we define a variable (network1) which is equal to the 
number of migrant entrepreneurs from the same country and located in the same municipality.  
 
The results of the estimate on a sample composed of observations only concerning migrant 
entrepreneurs (table 5, column 1) indicate the existence of a strong “network effect”: interest 
rates are 16 basis points lower when the number of community members increases by ten units. 
We replicate our estimate by measuring the network effect at the province level (network2). 
Column 2 shows that the effect is weaker when the area where the community is located is 
extended from a municipality to the province, supporting the view that social interaction 
requires physical proximity.  
 
 
4.4 The supply side 
 
As mentioned previously, the fourth channel for “bridging the gap” between migrants and the 
banking system may be to improve the ability of banks to deal with cultural diversities by, for 
example, offering certain products tailored to migrant characteristics, opening multiethnic points 
or adopting specific projects supported by foundations and public institutions.  
 
As we mentioned in section 4.1, migrants face a higher cost of credit when they lack a 
sufficiently long credit history. This problem can be quite severe when the banking system has 
accumulated little knowledge of foreign entrepreneurs, has not invested in improving its ability 
to interact with them or has failed to develop financial products suited to their needs.  
 
To test whether banks have really upgraded their ability to interact with migrants by facilitating 
access to credit and lowering the migrant/Italian interest rate differential, we estimate the 
benchmark equation on a sample of firms whose relationship with the banking system was less 
than 2-years old in the first and last quarter of the sample period. If our hypothesis is correct, 
the differential between interest rates applied to micro firms run by migrants and by Italians 
should be lower in the last quarter of the sample period, after controlling that monetary policy 




The results of the estimates confirm our hypothesis: the interest rate differential in the last 
quarter of our sample is 30 basis points lower than the one in the first quarter (table 6, columns 
2 and 3). The upgrading of banks’ supply for migrants determines a decrease in the interest rate 
differential between migrant and Italian entrepreneurs at the beginning of their relationship with 
the banking system. 
   
   
5 5. .
                                                
    Conclusions 
 
In recent years migrant entrepreneurship has spread rapidly in Italy. The financing of migrant 
firms presents some specificities, only partially investigated by the economic literature. In this 
paper we concentrate on the cost of bank credit.  
 
14 For this purpose we add two interaction terms between a dummy variable which identifies the quarters in which 
monetary policy has been tightened (restr) and the two dummy variables identifying migrant and Italian 
entrepreneurs (immi and noimmi). In particular, we identify the period of monetary tightening (from December 2005 
to December 2007) considering both the rise in official interest rates and in the 3-month interest rate in the 
interbank market. The results of the estimate show that the coefficients associated with the two interaction terms 
are not statistically different (table 6, column 1). However, the effect of monetary tightening on interest rates would 
be higher for migrants, widening the interest rate differential. 
  13According to the results of the econometric analysis, migrant entrepreneurs pay interest rates 
that are almost 70 basis points higher than those paid by their Italian counterparts. The results of 
the “natural experiment” represented by the lowering of the CR threshold suggest that, if 
anything, our analysis tend to underestimate the interest rate differential between migrants and 
natives. 
 
The lengthening of entrepreneurs’ credit history lowers interest rates; this effect is stronger for 
migrants, narrowing the differential between the interest rates charged to the two types of 
entrepreneur. We interpret this stronger effect as a result of a process by which banks increase 
their knowledge about clients characterized by higher ex-ante “opaqueness”, and migrant 
entrepreneurs learn how the Italian banking system works (“financial integration”).  
 
This interpretation is consistent with the empirical results concerning the cost of credit for two 
other kinds of entrepreneurs, characterized by different degrees of cultural integration: the 
“second generation” ones, born in Italy but of foreign parents, and “Italian migrants”, born in 
other countries but whose parents were born in Italy. According to the results of the estimates, 
the “second generation” entrepreneurs pay interest rates that are slightly higher than the Italian 
ones, while “Italian migrant” entrepreneurs pay interest rates that are lower than those paid by 
“pure” migrants. 
 
We also find that the size of the migrant community may, at least partially, compensate for the 
lack of an individual credit history: as the number of entrepreneurs coming from the same 
country headquartered in a given municipality increases, the interest rate declines.  
 
Finally, the improvement in the ability of the Italian banking system to interact with migrants 
has determined a decrease in the interest rate differential between migrant and Italian 
entrepreneurs at the beginning of their relationship with the banking system.  
 
  14Table 1 
 
Main features of micro firms 
(March 2004 - June 2008) 
 
 
<30 30-39 40-49 50-59 >59 TOTAL
Number of micro firms 
owned by migrants (a) 503             1,756            1,557            606             198             4,620         
percentage shares 10.9 38.0 33.7 13.1 4.3 100.0
Number of micro firms 
owned by Italians (b) 13,772        54,437          68,213          52,772        33,800        222,994     
percentage shares 6.2 24.4 30.6 23.7 15.2 100.0






Number of micro firms 
owned by migrants (a) 139             966               1,140            1,077          339             959             4,620         
percentage shares 3.0 20.9 24.7 23.3 7.3 20.8 100.0
Number of micro firms 
owned by Italians (b) 24,897        42,869          34,286          58,176        13,138        49,628        222,994     
percentage shares 11.2 19.2 15.4 26.1 5.9 22.3 100.0
More than 20 
employees
Between 5 
and  20 
employees
Less than 5 
employees
More than 20 
employees
Between 5 
and  20 
employees
Less than 5 
employees TOTAL
Number of micro firms 
owned by migrants (a) 23               101               2,052            34               85               2,325          4,620         
percentage shares 0.5 2.2 44.4 0.7 1.8 50.3 100.0
Number of micro firms 
owned by Italians (b) 1,481          7,975            77,113          1,439          4,861          130,125      222,994     
percentage shares 0.7 3.6 34.6 0.6 2.2 58.4 100.0






Source: Central Credit Register. 
(a) Sole proprietorships owned by an entrepreneur not born in Norway, Switzerland or in a EU15 
country. (b) Sole proprietorships owned by an entrepreneur  born in Norway, Switzerland or in a EU15 
country. 
  15Table 2 
 
Variable names and definitions 
 
  
Name Mean Std. deviation
R 9.62 2.701
Migrant entrepreneur 0.02 0.123
Second generation 0.02 0.131
Italian migrant 0.01 0.109
Age 49.60 12.024
Public aid 0.01 0.103
Loan size 11.54 1.064
Real guarantees 0.14 0.349
Bad loans 0.01 0.118
Multiple lending 0.46 0.499
Credit history 2.94 0.914
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has multiple 
lending relationships
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm is run by 
migrants (0 if not) 
Number of years elapsed since the firm was first entered in 
the Central Credit Register 
Description 
Interest rate charged to firm j by bank i on overdraft facilities
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm is run by an 
Italian migrant (0 if not)
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm is run by a 
second generation migrant (0 if not)
Entrepreneur's age
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has received 
public aid (0 if not)
Amount of the outstanding loans (in log)
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm is required a 
real guarantee (0 if not)
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has insolvency 
problems (0 if not)
 
  16Table 3 
Micro firms and loan interest rates 
This table lists the coefficients from a regression with the loan rate charged to sole proprietorships on credit lines (overdraft 
facilities), in percentage points, as the dependent variable. We employ ordinary least squares estimation. The "balanced" 
sample is obtained by identifying first the combination of  "lender, firm sector, firm size, firm town, entrepreneur gender, 
firm first year of reporting to the CR” among migrants (7,040 different combinations). Then we look for the same 
combination among natives, excluding the other ones left. We end up with a highly balanced sample where observations 
referred to migrants account for 48 per cent of the total. "Pair" fixed effects in columns 4 and 5 allow us to control jointly 
for “lender, firm sector, firm size, firm town, entrepreneur gender, firm first year of reporting to the CR”. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, two-tailed. 
Firm characteristics
Migrant entrepreneur 0.6772 *** 0.6234 *** 0.9131 *** 0.6963 ***
0.0130 0.0201 0.0284 0.0350
Age -0.0189 *** -0.0183 *** -0.0199 *** -0.0076 *** -0.0077 ***
0.0001 0.0010 0.0010 0.0012 0.0012
Public aid -0.1552 *** 0.4258 *** 0.2937 ** 0.0880 0.0446
0.0155 0.1205 0.1195 0.1441 0.1441
Loan characteristics
Loan size 0.0585 *** 0.1227 *** 0.1380 *** 0.0564 *** 0.0558 ***
0.0015 0.0091 0.0090 0.0081 0.0081
Real guarantees 0.9333 *** 1.2225 *** 1.1992 *** 0.5710 *** 0.5618 ***
0.0046 0.0240 0.0238 0.0226 0.0226
Bad loans 1.5592 *** 1.1267 *** 1.1273 *** 0.5101 *** 0.5139 ***
0.0134 0.0704 0.0697 0.0657 0.0657
Bank-firm relationship
Multiple lending -0.3713 *** -0.6381 *** -0.6794 *** -0.3412 *** -0.3327 ***
0.0035 0.0225 0.0223 0.0232 0.0232
Credit history -0.2105 *** -0.0929 *** -0.0941 *** -0.1628 *** -0.1579 ***
0.0021 0.0032 0.0032 0.0614 0.0614
Large bank 0.8840 ***
0.0272
Large bank*Migrant entrepreneur -0.4067 ***
0.0382
Migrant continent of origin
North America and Oceania 0.2232
0.1444






Eastern Europe 1.3495 ***
0.0770
Constant 10.2520 *** 9.3531 *** 8.7338 *** 9.7190 *** 9.7238 ***
0.0213 0.1233 0.1236 0.2363 0.2364
Adjusted R-squared 0.1502 0.1603 0.1756 0.5933 0.5942














Full sample Balanced sample
(3) (4)
  
  17Table 4 
Financial integration, cultural proximity and loan interest rates 
This table lists the coefficients from a regression with the loan rate charged to sole proprietorships on credit lines (overdraft 
facilities), in percentage points, as the dependent variable. We employ ordinary least squares estimation. The "balanced" 
sample is obtained by identifying first the combination of  "lender, firm sector, firm size, firm town, entrepreneur gender, 
firm first year of reporting to the CR” among migrants (7,040 different combinations). Then we look for the same 
combination among natives, excluding the other ones left. We end up with a highly balanced sample where observations 
referred to migrants account for 48 per cent of the total. In all regressions "pair" fixed effects are introduced; they allow  us 
to control jointly for "lender, firm sector, firm size, firm town, entrepreneur gender, firm first year of reporting to the CR”. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, two-tailed. 
Firm characteristics
Migrant entrepreneur 1.0792 *** 0.7916 *** 1.1350 ***
0.0553 0.0412 0.0592
Second generation 0.1858 *** -0.0193
0.0474 0.1062
Italian migrant -0.2416 *** -0.3168 ***
0.0642 0.1145
Age -0.0072 *** -0.0076 *** -0.0073 ***
0.0012 0.0012 0.0012
Public aid 0.1127 0.0756 0.0946
0.1440 0.1441 0.1441
Loan characteristics
Loan size 0.0560 *** 0.0552 *** 0.0554 ***
0.0081 0.0081 0.0081
Real guarantees 0.5656 *** 0.5692 *** 0.5626 ***
0.0226 0.0226 0.0227
Bad loans 0.5279 *** 0.5127 *** 0.5329 ***
0.0657 0.0657 0.0657
Bank-firm relationship
Multiple lending -0.3364 *** -0.3387 *** -0.3364 ***
0.0232 0.0232 0.0232
Credit history -0.1580 ***
0.0614
Credit history*Italian entrepreneur -0.1290 ** -0.1267 **
0.0615 0.0615
Credit history*Migrant entrepreneu -0.1929 *** -0.1987 ***
0.0615 0.0617
Credit history*Second generation 0.0257 **
0.0121
Credit history*Italian migrant 0.0377 ***
0.0133
Constant 9.4911 *** 9.7008 *** 9.4985 ***
0.2375 0.2362 0.2376
Adjusted R-squared 0.5938 0.5935 0.6327








  18Table 5 
Network effect and loan interest rates 
This table lists the coefficients from a regression with the loan rate charged to sole proprietorships on credit lines 
(overdraft facilities), in percentage points, as the dependent variable. We employ ordinary least squares estimation. 
The sample is composed of observations only concerning migrant entrepreneurs. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, two-tailed. 
Migrant continent of origin
Central America 0.3549 ** 0.3606 **
0.1443 0.1443
Latin America -0.0010 0.0031
0.0514 0.0514
Asia 0.6404 *** 0.6244 ***
0.0548 0.0547
Africa 0.3785 *** 0.3769 ***
0.0511 0.0512
Eastern Europe 0.4897 *** 0.4935 ***
0.0545 0.0545
Firm characteristics
Age -0.0276 *** -0.0277 ***
0.0014 0.0014
Public aid -0.3431 ** -0.3357 **
0.1449 0.1449
Loan characteristics
Loan size 0.0940 *** 0.0941 ***
0.0125 0.0125
Real guarantees 0.9030 *** 0.9027 ***
0.0293 0.0293
Bad loans 0.6524 *** 0.6552 ***
0.0780 0.0780
Bank-firm relationship
Multiple lending -0.5681 *** -0.5816 ***
0.0306 0.0304






Constant 9.8975 *** 9.8884 ***
0.1936 0.1938
Fixed effects
Bank and province yes yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.3114 0.3112
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Bank supply and loan interest rates 
This table lists the coefficients from a regression with the loan rate charged to sole proprietorships on credit lines (overdraft 
facilities), in percentage points, as the dependent variable. We employ ordinary least squares estimation. The "balanced" 
sample is obtained by identifying first the combination of  "lender, firm sector, firm size, firm town, entrepreneur gender, 
firm first year of reporting to the CR” among migrants (7,040 different combinations). Then we look for the same 
combination among natives, excluding the other ones left. We end up with a highly balanced sample where observations 
referred to migrants account for 48 per cent of the total. "Pair" fixed effects in column 1 allow us to control jointly for 
"lender, firm sector, firm size, firm town, entrepreneur gender, firm first year of reporting to the CR”. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level two-tailed. 
Firm characteristics
Migrant entrepreneur 0.6684 *** 1.0291 *** 0.7275 ***
0.0382 0.1112 0.0852
Age -0.0076 *** -0.0186 *** -0.0193 ***
0.0012 0.0031 0.0029
Public aid 0.0883 0.0514 0.0562
0.1441 0.4360 0.3998
Loan characteristics
Loan size 0.0563 *** 0.0537 0.1548 ***
0.0081 0.0345 0.0338
Real guarantees 0.5710 *** 1.3670 *** 1.5161 ***
0.0226 0.0818 0.0752
Bad loans 0.5084 *** 1.6695 *** 0.8885 ***
0.0657 0.3005 0.2584
Bank-firm relationship
Multiple lending -0.3410 *** -0.4023 *** -0.4627 ***
0.0232 0.1046 0.0897
Credit history -0.1628 ***
0.0614
Monetary tightening*Italian entrepreneur 1.1384 ***
0.2044
Monetary tightening*Migrant entrepreneur 1.1907 ***
0.2047
Constant 9.7307 *** 9.0744 *** 8.2862 ***
0.2363 0.5162 0.5090
Fixed effects
Bank and province yes yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.5934 0.2642 0.2418
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